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Minella: Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Orders in the Third Circuit:

ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ORDERS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT: THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE ARMCOR STANDARDS
I. INTRODUCTION

The use of the election and certification procedures of the National
Labor Relations Board (Board) is the most common and the preferred
method for a union to obtain recognition as the exclusive bargaining representative of an unorganized group of employees. 1 There are, however,
limited circumstances in which the Board may recognize a union as the
employees' bargaining representative and require the employer to bargain in
good faith even if the union has never won an election. 2 Under the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,3 the Board has the
discretion to issue a bargaining order based on its determination that
employer unfair labor practices have seriously dimmed the prospect of a fair
election, or that such practices have undermined the union majority,
thereby rendering a completed election invalid and casting doubt as to the
fairness of a rerun election. 4 The purpose of the bargaining order is to
ensure that a union which had enjoyed majority status, usually evidenced by
authorization cards, is not precluded from becoming the exclusive bargaining
5
representative because of unfair labor practices committed by the employer.
Failure to comply with a bargaining order issued by the Board may
result in the filing of a petition for enforcement with a circuit court of
appeals. 6 The circuit courts have generally been willing to enforce bar1. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969). In many instances, unions which
demonstrate majority support through the use of authorization cards or a strike may be voluntarily recognized by the employer. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 93 (1976). An employer may, however, refuse to recognize the union
and force the union to petition for an election. Linden Lumber Div., Sumner & Co. v. NLRB,
419 U.S. 301 (1974). For the election and certification procedures utilized by the Board, see 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
2. For circumstances in which a bargaining order may issue, see note 4 and accompanying
text infra.
3. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
4. Id. at 610-15. Employer unfair labor practices may have the effect of "undermining a
union's strength and destroying the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election." Id. at
612.
5. Id. at 614-15. A bargaining order should not issue, however, simply because it serves to
deter employer misconduct; the Board must also conclude that the employees' free choice will
be best effectuated by forcing recognition of the union. Id. at 614. For a discussion of these
policy considerations with respect to Board procedure, see notes 21-23 and accompanying text
infra.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). Section 10(e) provides in pertinent part:
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States ...
wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein [the violator] resides or
transacts business, for the enforcement of [its bargaining] order. . . . Upon the filing of
such petition [and serving of notice], the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding
to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and
...
and shall have power ...
enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board.
Id.

(913)
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gaining orders issued under Gissel, deferring to the Board's expertise in such
7
matters .
In NLRB v. Armcor Industries, Inc. (Armcor I),8 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to enforce a Board bargaining
order pending "further analysis and findings on the necessity for a bargaining
order." 9 In short, the court required the Board to "make 'specific findings'
as to the impact of the unfair labor practices on the election process and
clearly explicate the basis for its decision to issue a bargaining order." 10
Following a second remand to the Board, however, the Third Circuit, sitting
en banc, evenly divided in its reconsideration of the panel decision and issued no opinion."
As a result, the present state of the law in the Third
Circuit is uncertain as to 1) whether the Board is required to make specific
findings and to set forth a reasoned analysis consistent with the teaching of
Gissel; 2) whether the Board on remand is required to consider changed
circumstances at the job site; and 3) whether the Board can simply adopt the
findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), rather than
12
engaging in an independent analysis of its own.
This comment will examine Gissel's approval of the issuance of bargaining orders by the Board when employer unfair labor practices are
found to have undermined the union's majority. 13 The approach of the circuit courts in dealing with petitions for enforcement of bargaining orders will
then be considered.' 4 The focus, however, will be on the Third Circuit's
interpretation of the requirements of Gissel,' 5 culminating in an in-depth
analysis of the Armcor litigation.' 6 It will be suggested 1) that the court
ought clearly to re-adopt its holding in Armcor I requiring the Board to
make specific findings as to the impact of the unfair labor practices on the
election process and to explain its decision to issue a bargaining order; 2)
that the Board ought to consider changed circumstances on remand; and 3)
that it is sufficient for the Board to adopt the findings and conclusions of the
7

ALJ.1

7. See, e.g., Bandag v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978); C&W Supermarkets, Inc. v.
NLRB, 581 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1978); Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 251
(9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Woodline, Inc., 577 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1978). See generally NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 612 n.32.
8. 535 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976), remanded, 98 L.R.R.M. 2441 (3d Cir. May 1, 1978), aff'd
on rehearing, 588 F,2d 821 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc). For a discussion of Armcor I, see notes
65-76 and accompanying text infra.
9. 535 F.2d at 246.
10. Id. at 245.
11. See NLRB v. Armor Industries, Inc., 588 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1978). The effect of the
court's even split was to refuse enforcement of the Board's bargaining order. Id.
12. See notes 119-67 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 24-39 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 40-60 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 61-118 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 65-76 & 107-18 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 125-73 and accompanying text infra.
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II. BACKGROUND

Not all unfair labor practices rise to the level of seriousness required for
the issuance of a bargaining order.1 8 In less egregious situations, the Board
will typically order the offending employer to cease and desist, and, if the
unfair labor practices involved unlawful discharge, the Board will order
to direct that a
reinstatement and back pay. 19 The Board is also empowered
20
secret ballot election, or rerun election, be held.
In those situations where a bargaining order is determined to be the
only effective remedy, however, authorization cards play an important role
as evidence of a union's majority status at some point in time prior to the
election. 21 So long as the card itself states unambiguously on its face that
the signer authorizes the union to represent him for collective bargaining
purposes, the card will be considered valid for that purpose and included in
the count of union support. 22 If the solicitor of the card, however, verbally
informs the signer that the sole purpose of the card is to enable the union to
designation of the union as barpetition for an election, then the apparent
23
gaining representative will be overcome.
A. The Gissel Decision
In Gissel, the Supreme Court approved the Board's use of bargaining
orders to remedy the effect of employer unfair labor practices on the elec-

18. See notes 28-32 and accompanying text infra.
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 851 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
Section 10(c) provides in pertinent part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that
any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be
served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976). The remedies of an election, a cease-and-desist order, and
reinstatement for improperly discharged employees are considered "traditional" remedies. See
395 U.S. at 614.
21. See 395 U.S. at 614.
22. Id. at 606-07. If the card, however, only authorizes a request for an election, it is not
considered the designation of a bargaining representative and it will not be counted for union
support. R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 95 (1976).
23. 395 U.S. at 606. On the other hand, if the card on its face explicitly and solely designates the union as exclusive bargaining agent, then "an employee signature on that card will
count toward a valid union majority, and will not be undermined by statements made by the
card solicitor that the card will no doubt be used if the union wishes to secure an election." R.
GORMAN, supra note 1, at 95. As the Gissel Court explained:
There is nothing inconsistent in handing an employee a card that says the signer authorizes the union to represent him and then telling him that the card will probably be
used first to get an election. Elections have been, after all, and will continue to be, held
in the vast majority of cases; the union will still have to have the signatures of 30% of the
employees when an employer rejects a bargaining demand and insists that the union seek
an election.
395 U.S. at 606-07.
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tion process. 24 The Court indicated that the Board is invested with the
discretion to determine whether the employer's practices undermined majority support for the union, and to gauge the potential effect of these practices
on a future election.2 5 By exercising this function, the Board can decide
whether traditional remedies are inadequate, 26 and may order the employer
to bargain with the union on the basis of the card majority it possessed at
2 7
some point prior to the election.
The Gissel Court separated employer unfair labor practices impacting
the election process into three categories. 2 8 The practices in the first category require the issuance of a bargaining order regardless of the presence or
absence of a majority showing on authorization cards.2 9 It consists of "exceptional" cases which are marked by unfair labor practices that can be
characterized as "outrageous" and "pervasive." 30 Under the second category, once the existence of a valid card majority has at some point been
shown, a bargaining order may issue "in less extraordinary cases marked by
less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process." 31 The third
24. 395 U.S. at 614. The Gissel decision, which consolidated four cases, dealt with election
campaigns in which the employers committed unfair labor practices prior to an election. Id. at
579-82, 587-89. In two of the cases, the Board ordered an employer's election victory set aside,
while in the other two cases elections had not yet been held. Id. at 580-82, 589. In each case,
the Board directed the employer to bargain on the basis of a valid card majority which had been
undermined by the employer unfair labor practices. Id. at 582-85, 589.
25. Id. at 614. For the role of authorization cards in determining union majority, see notes

21-23 and accompanying text supra.
26. See note 20 supra.
27. 395 U.S. at 614-15. The Gissel Court stated "that a bargaining order is designed as
much to remedy past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct." Id. at 612. The
Court reasoned that the traditional remedies of a cease-and-desist order followed by an election,
or rerun election, would not be sufficient, since once "an employer has succeeded in undermining a union's strength and destroying the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election,
he may see no need to violate a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity." Id. The
Court recognized that once the damage has been done, the only way in which to right the
wrong fairly is, through the vehicle of the bargaining order, to put the employees in the position they would likely have occupied but for the employer's unfair labor practices. Id.
28. See id. at 613-15.
29. Id. at 613.
30. Id. In such a case, the bargaining order is the appropriate remedy if the unfair practices
are of "such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of
traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had." Id. at 614,
quoting NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir.1967). It should be noted that,
prior to Gissel, the Board had long had a history of issuing bargaining orders when it was the
only available, effective remedy for unfair labor practices. 395 U.S.at 614, citing United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1967); J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB, 384
F.2d 479, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1967).
It has been observed that from the time Gissel was decided through 1974, the Board had
never issued a bargaining order without first determining that the union had attained majority
status. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 144 (Supp. A. Bioff, L. Cohen & K. Hanslawe eds.
1971-1975). Furthermore, the Board has yet to issue a bargaining order on the ground that the
employer's unfair labor practice was an "exceptional," first category offense. Thus, the effect of
Gissel was to approve the Board's use of bargaining orders in less extraordinary situations. See
395 U.S. at 614. See also note 31 and accompanying text infra.
31. 395 U.S. at 614. If the Board determines that the possibility of eradicating the coercive
effects of past unfaiir labor practices is slight, and that employee sentiment expressed through
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category consists of "less extreme" or "minor" unfair labor practices which,
because of their "minimal impact on the election machinery," do not neces32
sitate the issuance of a bargaining order.
The employers in Gissel argued that a bargaining order was unduly
harsh and punitive. 3 3 It was their position that a cease-and-desist order
followed by a secret-ballot election would eliminate any taint on the election
process, 34 and that the Board had further remedies with which to deal with
employer unfair labor practices. 3 5 The Court, however, made it clear that
"i]t is for the Board and not the courts ... to [determine the necessity for a
bargaining order] based on its expert estimate as to the effects on the elec3 6
tion process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity."
Although recognizing that bargaining orders serve to both effectuate
"ascertainable employee free choice" 3 7 and deter employer misconduct, 3 8
the Court emphasized the "superiority of the election process" in ensuring
employee free choice, stating "that secret elections are generally the most
satisfactory -indeed the preferred- method of ascertaining whether a union
3 9
has majority support."
B. Judicial Response to the Board's Procedure
In Issuing Bargaining Orders
When presented with a refusal to bargain subsequent to
gaining order, the judiciary has generally affirmed the Board's
enforced the order. 40 A number of circuit courts, however,
enforcement and, in addition, have chastised the Board for

a Gissel bardecision and
have refused
its failure to

the use of authorization cards would be best protected by a bargaining order, then an order
should be issued. Id. at 614-15. See, e.g., Ludwig Fish & Produce, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1086
(1975); Montgomery Ward & Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 373 (1975); Dallas Ceramic Co., 219 N.L.R.B.
582 (1975); Two Wheel Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 486 (1975); Zim Textile Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 269
(1975); Vernon Devices, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 475 (1974).
32. 395 U.S. at 615. See, e.g., Rennselaer Polytechnic Inst., 219 N.L.R.B. 712 (1975); Sands
Indus., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 461 (1975); Beckett Aviation Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 238 (1975); Lasco
Indus., 217 N.L.R.B. 527 (1975); Colony Knitwear Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 245 (1975); Treadway
Inn, 217 N.L.R.B. 51 (1975).
33. 395 U.S. at 612.
34. Id. at 612 n.32.
35. Id. at 611-12. The employers asserted that the Board could order the companies "to
mail notices to employees, to read notices to employees during plant time and to give the union
access to employees during working time at the plant," or, as a last resort, the Board could seek
an injunction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976). 395 U.S. at 611-12.
36. 395 U.S. at 612 n.32. As a corollary, the Court noted that there is "no per se rule that
the commission of any unfair practice will automatically result in . . . an order to bargain." Id.
at 615.
37. Id. at 614.
38. Id.
39. Id.at 602.
40. See, e.g., Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978); C&W Supermarkets,
Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1978); Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NLRB, 578
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Woodline, Inc., 577 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1978). See generally
R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 98.
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properly discharge its duty as set forth in Gissel to issue bargaining orders
41
only when traditional remedies are inadequate.
Seeking to bring "a degree of certainty and uniformity" to the Board's
decisions to issue bargaining orders, 42 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc.,43 recommended that
the Board articulate its position with respect to the issuance of such orders
by adopting one of three suggested methods. 4 4 Of these three alternatives,
the court favored the exercise of the Board's rulemaking powers to synthesize general principles upon which employers, unions, and reviewing courts
could rely for an indication of the type of employer activity which would
result in a bargaining order as opposed to a traditional remedy. 45 Alternatively, the court envisioned that, in the context of a particular case, the full
five-member Board should articulate "how it meant to apply its Gissel-given
authority." 46 Finally, the court was willing to accept an explanation by the
Board "in each case [of] just what it considers to have precluded a fair election and why, and in what respects the case differs from others where it has
47
reached an opposite conclusion."
Whereas the General Stencil court would have preferred general rules
or guidelines, 48 several circuit courts have merely sought specific findings
41. See, e.g., First Lakewood Assoc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978); Peerless of
America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973); New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441
F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1971); General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 414 F.2d 661 (5th
Cir. 1969), enforcement denied on rehearing, 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957
(1970). See notes 42-60 and accompanying text infra.
42. NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1971).
43. 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971).
44. Id. at 901-02.
45. Id. at 901. The court recognized the Board's distaste for using its rulemaking powers,
and the difficulty of constructing a rule to cover all the variations of employer unfair practices,
but was of the opinion that a rule based on one or more hypothetical situations would at least
give notice of the Board's outlook. Id.
46. Id. at 902. The court maintained that an opinion by the full Board in a Gissel bargaining
order case would furnish a framework of consistency for the three-member panels to which the
Board usually delegates authority. Id.
47. Id. On remand, the Board failed to adopt any general principles, and simply found, on
the basis of the facts of the particular case, that a bargaining order was required. General
Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 1109, 1111 (1972). Then-Chairman Miller dissented, finding that
under the general principles he had proposed there was an insufficient showing of dissemination
of the employer's threats. Id. at 1114 (Miller, Chairman, dissenting). Pursuant to Miller's formulation, employer misconduct could be divided into two categories-action and threats. Id. at
1112-13 (Miller, Chairman, dissenting). Employer action, Miller indicated, was sufficient to justify per se imposition of a bargaining order when it included 1) the grant of significant benefits,
or 2) repeated "reassignment, demotion, or discharge of union adherents." Id. at 1112 (Miller,
Chairman, dissenting). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3). Threats by employers, though never per
se justification for a bargaining order, could serve as the basis for an order to bargain, according
to Miller, contingent upon the answers to three questions: "(1) What actions were threatened?;
(2) Were the threats under all circumstances, likely to be seriously regarded?; (3) How widely
were the threats disseminated among the employee group?" 195 N.L.R.B. at 1113 (Miller,
Chairman, dissenting). On petition for enforcement of the Board's reissued order, the Second
Circuit indicated that it agreed with Chairman Miller and refused enforcement of the bargaining
order due to lack of support on the record. NLRB v. General Stencils, 472 F.2d 170, 172-75 (2d
Cir. 1972).
48. See 438 F.2d at 901-02; notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
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and detailed reasons for the Board's decisions to issue bargaining orders in
the particular cases. 49 These courts have objected to the Board's failure to
articulate the insufficiency of traditional remedies, and have questioned the
Board's reasoning in deciding that the "laboratory conditions" essential for a
50
secret ballot election were not present.
For example, in NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc. (American
Cable I),51 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted Gissel strictly, requiring Board determinations a) that there was a
valid card majority in the unit; b) that the unfair labor practices of the
employer were "serious and extensive"; c) that there was only a slight possibility that conventional remedies would insure a fair election; and d) that
employee sentiment would best be served by an order to bargain. 52 In
remanding the case a second time (American Cable II), the court further
remarked that bargaining orders issued under Gissel on the basis of card
majority are extraordinary and must be based on present need.5 3 The court
rejected the Board's conclusory statement of findings, requesting specific information in order to satisfy the test of American Cable 1.54
49. See, e.g., First Lakewood Assocs. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978); Peerless of
America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973); New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441
F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
American Cable Sys., Inc., 414 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1969), enforcement denied on rehearing, 414
F.2d 661 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). For a discussion of these cases, see notes
50-60 and accompanying text infra.
50. See cases cited note 49 supra. According to the Board, its function in election proceedings is to establish conditions "as nearly ideal as possible" in order to determine the
employees' true desires, and to ascertain whether these conditions have been fulfilled. General
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). See also note 4 and accompanying text supra.
51. 414 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1969), enforcement denied on rehearing, 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
52. 414 F.2d at 668-69.
53. NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 427 F.2d 446, 448-49, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
957 (1970). According to the Fifth Circuit, Gissel bargaining orders are not "the type of remedy
which is automatically entitled to enforcement at any time after the occurrence of the unfair
labor practice." 427 F.2d at 448 (emphasis added). The court criticized the Board for failing to
consider the circumstances existing at the time it reissued its bargaining order following the first
remand:
[T]he Board refused to look at the contemporary necessity for such an order, satisfying
itself with a jejune regurgitation of the Company's 1965 waywardness. We deem such
findings insufficient under the teachings of Gissel to justify a 1970 bargaining order. Gissel
does not apply a nunc pro tunc principle, giving the then sins of the Company a now
application. . . . Industrial democracy should be allowed to work its will if the present
conditions are sufficiently antiseptic for an election.
Id. at 448-49.
54. 427 F.2d at 449. The court stated:
The response which we received was a litany, reciting conclusions by rote without factual
explication. We believe that the questions involved in this area of labor law are far too
important for such formalistic and perfunctory treatment. Since Gissel teaches us that
authorization cards are not as trustworthy as ballots all concerned must be particularly
careful lest the principles of majoritarianism in union representation be unnecessarily frustrated by the cavalier use of bargaining orders.
Id. The Fifth Circuit has continued to apply the four-pronged test it set out in American Cable
1,requiring the Board to make specific findings in each area supported by substantial evidence
prior to its enforcement of a bargaining order issued by the Board. See, e.g., Bandag, Inc. v.
NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Gibson Prod. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 764-66
(5th Cir. 1974). For the American Cable I test, see text accompanying note 52 supra.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has similarly criticized the Board for not meeting the standard of "precise analysis
required by Gissel," 55 noting that the Board's attention must be focused on
the "causal relationship between the unlawful practices and the election
process." 5 6 Mere recital of the employer's unfair labor practices and conclusory statements that its prior conduct rendered the holding of a fair election unlikely were not considered to constitute sufficient compliance with
57
Gissel.
In Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 58 the Seventh Circuit clearly
enunciated its position that Gissel requires the Board to make " 'specific
findings' as to the immediate and residual impact of the unfair labor practices on the election process." 59 According to the Peerless court, the Board
must undertake a "detailed analysis" of the possibility of conducting a fair
election, taking into account the effect of continuing misconduct, the potential for future misconduct, and the potential effectiveness of traditional Board
remedies. 60
III. GIssEL BARGAINING ORDERS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

A. The Third Circuit's Decision in Armcor I
Prior to its decision in Armcor I,6l the Third Circuit had enforced bargaining orders issued by the Board pursuant to the Supreme Court's opinion
in Gissel "without explicitly requiring the Board to support its decision with
a statement of findings and conclusions." 62 In these cases, the Third Circuit apparently based its decisions to enforce on both a) its policy of defer55. New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1971). See also NLRB v.
Kostel Corp. 440 F.2d 347, 351 (7th Cir. 1971). In New Alaska, the Board had found past
threats to be of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of a fair election. Id. In rejecting
this analysis as insufficient, the Seventh Circuit articulated which determinations it sought from
the Board: 1) the extensiveness of threats and impact on the election; 2) the chance of recurrence of the illegal practice; 3) the possibility that impact could be erased by traditional remedies, thus enabling a fair election to be held; and 4) the likelihood that, on balance, employee
sentiment expressed in the prior card majority would be better protected by a bargaining order.
Id.
56. NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 351 (7th Cir. 1971).
57. Id.
58. 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973).
59. Id. at 1118.
60. Id. That the Seventh Circuit continues to require specific findings consistent with its
decision in Peerless is demonstrated by its holding in First Lakewood Associates v. NLRB, 582
F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978). The First Lakewood court maintained that the Board had failed to
consider the future impact of the employer unfair labor practices, had been silent as to whether
the employer's conduct was likely to recur, and had not discussed the efficacy of holding an
election. Id. at 423.
61. 535 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976).
62. Id. at 244 n.8, citing NLRB v. Juniata Packing Co., 464 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB
v. Colonial Knitting Corp., 464 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Easton Packing Co., 437
F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1971). The court noted that the opinions in those prior cases "do not indicate
whether the Board decisions contained sufficient supporting statements, nor do the opinions
indicate that the lack of such statements was raised as an issue." 535 F.2d at 244 n.8.
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rence to the Board's "broad discretionary remedial powers," 63 and b) Gis64
sel's mandate calling for a limited scope of judicial review.
In Armcor I, however, the Third Circuit remanded for "specific find65
ings" and a "reasoned analysis justifying a bargaining order under Gissel."
When issuing the bargaining order, the Board had articulated only that the
union had a card majority and that the employer had engaged in various
66
unfair labor practices.
Although recognizing that the reviewing court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the Board in areas of Board expertise,6 7 Judge Rosenn,
writing for the majority, noted that "deference to the Board's expertise does
not require abdication of [the court's reviewing function]."68 The court intended that the requirement of a "reasoned analysis" from the Board would
ensure informed judicial review of the Board's bargaining orders6 9 and pro70
tect against "arbitrary exercise of the Board's power."
More specifically, the court would have had the Board estimate the actual impact of the unfair labor practices in light of the particular facts of the
case, and assess the potential for recurring misconduct on the part of the
employer.71 Further, the court sought an appraisal of the possibility of cur72
ing prior unfair labor practices through the use of traditional remedies.
63. See, e.g., NLRB v. Easton Packing Co., 437 F.2d 811, 814 (3d Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the Gissel Court's limitation on the function of the reviewing court, see note 36 and
accompanying text supra.
64. NLRB v. Easton Packing Co., 437 F.2d 811, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1971). See also NLRB v.
Juniata Packing Co., 464 F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Colonial Knitting Corp., 464
F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1972).
65. 535 F.2d at 244.
66. Armcor Indus., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 358, 359 (1975). The Board's consideration of the
propriety of issuing a bargaining order was limited to the following:
We have found that on or about May 28, and at all times thereafter, a majority of the
Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit signed authorization cards designating the
union as their representative for purposes of collective bargaining. Thereafter the Respondent, by its agents and supervisors, engaged in acts and conduct of an extensive and
egregious nature, including discriminatory charges, all of which was designed to interrupt,
thwart, and destroy the employee's support of the union, and make the holding of a fair
election impossible. We therefore find that the circumstances of this case require a
bargaining order as the only appropriate remedy for the Respondent's misconduct.
Id. In response to the union organizational campaign, Armcor had discharged two employees,
one of whom was considered to be the instigator of the union activity, while the other was
among those who had signed union authorization cards. 535 F.2d at 243. In addition, the
employer had interrogated various employees regarding their union sympathies, threatened
serious economic consequences if a union was to come in, and indicated the opportunity for
additional benefits if the union was kept out. Id. at 242.
67. 535 F.2d at 245. For the Gissel Court's teaching on this issue, see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
68. 535 F.2d at 245, citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Also
sitting on the panel were Circuit Judges Gibbons and Forman. Id. at 240. Judge Gibbons filed a
separate opinion dissenting in part. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text infra.
69. Id. at 245.
70. Id., quoting Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1975).
71. 535 F.2d at 245, citing Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118 n.16
(7th Cir. 1973).
72. 535 F.2d at 245, citing Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118 n.16
(7th Cir. 1973).
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This appraisal was to be accomplished by a Board examination of the
employer's past misconduct and his subsequent efforts to rectify his misconduct or otherwise ensure a fair election. 73 On remand, the Board was instructed to determine the necessity of a bargaining order in light of the
74
conditions existing at the plant at the time of the remand.
Although agreeing that the employer had committed unfair labor practices and that the Board should be required to undertake a reasoned analysis
justifying the issuance of a bargaining order, Judge Gibbons dissented in
part from the majority's decision in Arnwor 1.75 In his view, the reasons set
forth by the Board were sufficient and, thus, the bargaining order should
76
have been enforced.
B. The Rise of the Armcor I Doctrine
The standards developed in Armcor I were subsequently applied and
elaborated upon in other decisions of the Third Circuit. 77 In NLRB v.
Eagle Material Handling, Inc. ,78 for example, the court reviewed the
Board's bargaining order under the Armcor I standards and granted the petition for enforcement. 79 After a careful examination of the findings of both
the Board and the ALJ, s0 the Board was found to have rendered an
adequately detailed analysis-albeit minimally sufficient-to comply with
Armcor 1.81

Again emphasizing the need for a "specific findings," the Third Circuit,
in Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB,1 2 remanded the case for further proceedings because the Board had not, in accordance with Armcor I, provided a "detailed
analysis" of the possibility of a fair rerun election, nor an assessment of the
73. 535 F.2d at 245, citing Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118 n.16
(7th Cir. 1973).
74. 535 F.2d at 246. The court instructed the Board to consider whether present conditions
at the plant were "still so contaminated as to warrant a bargaining order." Id. See also note 53
supra. Further, the court indicated its preference for secret ballot elections. 535 F.2d at 246,
citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 602. See also note 39 and accompanying text
supra.
75. 535 F.2d at 246 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part).
76. Id. Judge Gibbons stated: "I do not share Judge Rosenn's doubt that the unfair labor
practices found here would detract from the integrity of the electoral process." Id.
77. See notes 78-86 and accompanying text infra.
78. 558 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977).
79. Id. at 166-68.
80. Id. at 167. The court noted: "In Armcor, unlike this case, the findings of the ALJ
affirmed by the Board added nothing to the findings mentioned in the decision of the Board
itself. The Board and the ALJ provided identical statements in support of the necessity for a
bargaining order." Id. at 167 n.10.
81. Id. at 167. Although noting that the Board's analysis "lacks the lucidity we would prefer," id., the court explained:
The bargaining order in the instant case was entered before we rendered our decision in Armcor. We mention this not because pre-Armcor bargaining orders are subject to
less searching review than post-Armcor orders, but rather to explain why the Board's
findings and analysis are not more complete. This case displays what we consider to be
minimally sufficient compliance with Armcor.
Id. at 167 n.ll (emphasis in original).
82. 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977).
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effectiveness of traditional remedies. 8 3 Conclusory statements that the unfair labor practices had been "numerous and extensive" were considered in84
adequate.
8 5
the
Shortly thereafter, in a per curiam opinion in NLRB v. Craw,
Third Circuit indicated that it expected the Board itself to engage in the
"independent analysis" required by Armcor I, rather than to simply adopt
86
the findings of the ALJ.
C. Kenworth Trucks-The Turning Point
In Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. v. NLRB,87 the court initially
reiterated its determination in Craw,88 finding that the Board itself "should
undertake to articulate independently the basis of a bargaining order that it
will seek to have this Court enforce, and not merely adopt the ALJ's findings
and conclusions." 8' 9 The Board had contended that, since the ALJ is an
agent of the Board, the Board's adoption of his findings was tantamount to
its having made the findings itself. 90 This argument was rejected by the
court on the basis of precedent, 9 1 and on the ground that it is the Board,
92
rather than the ALJ, which is considered the ultimate authority.
The panel in Kenworth granted a rehearing 93 in light of a recent Supreme Court decision which cautioned reviewing courts against imposing
their conception of proper procedures upon administrative agencies. 94 Al-

83. Id. at 1152. The Board had reversed the ALJ's decision that a bargaining order was
unnecessary, but did not issue specific findings of its own. Hedstrom Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1409,
1410 (1976). The case arose in the context of a union challenge to an election it had lost in one
of the employer's plants. Id. The challenge was based on the union's contention that the employer's election-eve speech to a "captive audience" of employees constituted an unfair labor
practice. Id.
84. 558 F.2d at 1150.
85. 565 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1977). The unfair labor practice at issue was the employer's
prediction that there could be layoffs, a wage freeze, and drawn-out bargaining if a union was
successfully organized. Id. at 1268.
86. Id. at 1271. The court concluded that, under the doctrine of Armcor I, it was impermissible for the Board to simply adopt the findings and conclusions of the ALJ because a bargaining
order is an extraordinary remedy requiring "the Board ...to explain with specificity the results of the unfair labor practices, and, in particular, the unlikelihood of a fair election." 565
F.2d at 1272 (emphasis added).
87. 580 F.2d 55, enforced on rehearing, 580 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1978).
88. Id. at 59. For a discusson of Craw, see notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
89. 580 F.2d at 61.
90. Id. at 59.
91. Id. For a discussion of the cases serving as precedent for the court's opinion, see notes
65-86 and accompanying text supra.
92. 580 F.2d at 60. The court stated that "[wihat is warranted is some guarantee that the
NLRB . . .has carefully considered and sifted the evidence of unfair practices in determining
whether the remedy of a bargaining order is needed." Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id.at61.
94. Id., citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court reversed a decision
of the District of Columbia Circuit which had held that the Atomic Energy Commission had
applied inadequate procedures in deciding to issue a license, even though such procedures were
in compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act. 435 U.S. at 535.
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though continuing to require a detailed explanation for the decision that a
bargaining order is necessary, 95 the Third Circuit retreated somewhat from
its Armcor I standards, 96 holding that the Board need not supply an independent explanation if it specifically adopts the findings and reasoning of the
9 7

ALJ.

D. The Decline of Armcor I
What remained of the Armcor I doctrine suffered a heavy blow in
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB. 98 In Frito-Lay, the court upheld a bargaining
order issued by the Board, 99 without discussion of the Armcor I doctrine. 1 0 0 Apparently yielding to the "experienced judgment" of the
Board, 101 the court found substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the unfair labor practices were sufficiently egregious to undermine the union's majority status and to preclude the possibility of a fair
rerun election. 10 2 In a subsequent decision, NLRB v. Daybreak Lodge
Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc. ,103 the court considered the dictates
of Armcor ,o104 but, relying on Kenworth, 05s simply indicated that "[t]he
ALJ's findings and conclusions which the Board adopted were sufficient to
meet the standard of analysis and elucidation set by Armcor 1." 106
Two years after its decision in Armcor I, the Third Circuit was asked
again to enforce the Board's bargaining order against Armcor Industries as
issued following the Board's reconsideration on remand.' 0 7 Armcor II arose
95. 580 F.2d at 62.
96. See notes 65-86 and accompanying text supra.
97. 580 F.2d at 62-63. The court specifically limited its holding to those instances "where
the ALJ has provided a rational statement of the reasons for a bargaining order and the NLRB
has adopted such a statement." Id. at 63 n.6.
98. 585 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978). While Kenworth left intact the basis of the Armcor I
doctrine-i.e., the requirements of "specific findings" and "a detailed analysis" to support the
bargaining order-it removed the requirement that the Board itself must undertake the findings and analysis. See notes 93-97 and accompanying text supra.
99. Frito-Lay, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 753, 754-55 (1977). The employer in Frito-Lay was
charged with implementing a raise, threatening shutdown of the plant, and coercing individual
employees in response to union organizational activity. Id. at 755. The union, which was subsequently defeated in the election, objected on the basis of the employer's unfair labor practices, culminating in the plant's shutdown. Id. at 754-55.
100. 585 F.2d at 63-69. Moreover, the Frito-Lay court failed to discuss any of the relevant
cases subsequent to Arrncor I. Id. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 77-97 and accompanying text supra.
101. 585 F.2d at 68-69, citing NLRB v. Juniata Packing Co., 464 F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir.
1972).
102. 585 F.2d at 68-69.
103. 585 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 81-82.
105. Id. at 81. For a discussion of Kenworth, see notes 87-97 and accompanying text supra.
106. 585 F.2d at 81.
107. NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc. (Armeor II), 98 L.R.R.M. 2441 (3d Cir. 1978). The
Armcor I court had "remanded the case to the Board for 'further analysis and findings on the
necessity for a bargaining order,' and instructed the Board to 'consider whether present conditions at the plant are still so contaminated as to warrant' such an order." Id. at 2442, quoting
NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d at 246. See also notes 65-74 and accompanying text
supra.
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out of the Board's petition for enforcement of this reissued bargaining order. l0 8 In its reconsideration, the Board had disregarded the court's instruction to consider the present conditions at the job site, 10 9 analyzing, instead, the effect of the employer's conduct at the time of the unfair labor
practices." 0 The Armcor II court again remanded,"' requiring the Board
112
to fully consider the changed circumstances now existing at the plant.
Dissenting in Armcor II, Judge Higginbotham stated that he would
have enforced the bargaining order based on the Board's finding that the
employer's past practices could have had a sufficiently serious present impact." l 3 He did not, however, require the Board to do anything more than
speculate as to the present conditions at the plant, nor did he clearly opine
whether the Board must consider changed circumstances following a remand. 1 14 Further, he criticized the majority for "disregard[ing]" the Supreme Court's "admonition" against imposing upon the Board what the court
considers to be the proper procedure. 115
Armcor II was subsequently reheard en banc (Armcor JIJ),116 and, after
reconsideration of the case, was affirmed without opinion. 117 The court,
108. 98 L.R.R.M. at 2441-42.
109. Id. at 2442, citing NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d at 246. The Armcor II court
stated:
When we remanded the case to the Board, we specifically instructed it to justify the
bargaining order in light of the conditions existing at Armcor at the time of the remand
Instead the Board has given us an elaborate
and the preference for a free election ....
explanation of why the initial bargaining order would have been necessary at the time of
the unfair labor practices.
98 L.R.R.M. at 2442 (emphasis by the court), citing NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d at
246.
110. Armcor Indus., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1543, 1545 (1977).
111. 98 L.R.R.M. at 2444-45.
112. Id. at 2442. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Rosenn and Higginbotham, and District Judge Van Artsdalen, sitting by designation. Id. at 2441. Judge Rosenn, again, wrote the
opinion for the majority. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
113. 98 L.R.R.M. at 2445 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham deferred to
the Boards's "careful analysis" of the impact of the employer's conduct. Id. at 2446 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Although submitting that the Board's order was in compliance with "the
standards set forth in Armcor I," Judge Higginbotham indicated that he did not necessarily
support the rationale of that decision, stating: "If I were obliged to in banc reevaluate the
rationale of Armcor I, I might be inclined to find the dissent of Judge Gibbons more persuasive." Id. at 2446 n.1 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), citing 535 F.2d at 246 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part).
114. See 98 L.R.R.M. at 2446 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). For the majority's holding regarding changed circumstances, see text accompanying note 112 supra.
115. 98 L.R.R.M. at 2446, citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
116. 588 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1978). See FED. R. APp. P. 35(a). Rule 35(a) provides:
A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an
appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals in banc. Such a
hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when
consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decision, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
Id. For an indication of the split in the Third Circuit regarding the issues raised in the Armcor
litigation, see 535 F.2d at 246 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part); 98 L.R.R.M. at 2446 n.1 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); notes 75-76 & 113-15 and accompanying text supra.
117. 588 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1978).
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in issuing no opinion or rulings, effectively refused enforcement of the bargaining order. 118
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES PRESENTED BY
THE EN BANC DECISION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT IN ARMCOR III

As a result of the court's even split in Armcor 111,119 what is expected of
the Board in issuing Gissel bargaining orders remains undecided in the
Third Circuit. It is suggested that the Armcor I requirements, by which the
Third Circuit compelled the Board to be more responsive to the teachings of
Gissel, 120 may have been eviscerated.' 2 ' The following issues, which remain open because of the en banc court's failure to arrive at a majority, will
continue to plague the Third Circuit: 1) whether the Board should be required to make specific findings and to "set forth a reasoned analysis justifying a bargaining order under Gissel"; 122 2) whether the Board, on remand,
will be required to confront, in a meaningful way, the changed circumstances existing at the time of the remand; 123 and 3) whether it is sufficient for the Board to adopt the findings and conclusions of the ALJ, rather
124
than engaging in an independent analysis.
A. The Board Should Be Required to Make Specific Findings and
Provide a Reasoned Analysis in Order to Justify a Gissel Bargaining Order
The degree of detail ultimately required of the Board in justifying the
issuance of a Gissel bargaining order is key to the Board's burden of proof in
seeking enforcement of its order. In light of the fact that the Board's failure
to provide a "detailed analysis" was the basis for the court's remand in
Armcor 1,125 and considering that the Armcor II dissent agreed with Judge
Gibbons' position in Armcor I that the Board's statement of reasons was
sufficient, 126 it is likely that this was an issue which subsequently divided
the Third Circuit sitting en banc. It is submitted that the effect of Judge
Gibbons' position would be to enforce bargaining orders in virtually every
case, since the Board's statement of reasons, which he found satisfactory,
127
constituted nothing more than conclusory boiler plate.
Arguably, the Supreme Court's caution against judicial intrusion into
agency procedures 128 suggests that reviewing courts ought not require more
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

588 F.2d at 821.
notes 116-18 and accompanying text supra.
notes 65-86 and accompanying text supra.
notes 125-27 and accompanying text infra.
notes 65-73 and accompanying text supra.
notes 74 & 109-14 and accompanying text supra.
notes 85-92 & 97 and accompanying text supra.
notes 65-74 and accompanying text supra.

126. 98 L.R.R.M. at 2446 n.1 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), citing 535 F.2d at 246 (Gib-

bons, J., dissenting in part). See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra; note 113 supra.
127. For the Board's statement of reasons in Armcor I, see note 66 supra.
128. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978); note 94 and accompanying text supra.
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of the Board than the Board itself considers sufficient. 1 29 In asking the
Board for a detailed analysis in place of conclusory assertions, however, the
Armcor I court did not substitute its conception of proper procedures for the
judgment of the Board.' 3 0 Although the requirement for "specific findings"
might further burden the Board and indirectly affect its operational procedures, the courts have a recognized need for detailed records on which to
base their review.' 3 ' In fact, in the same opinion in which the Supreme
Court reminded the courts to accord deference to agency procedures, the
Court indicated that a matter must be remanded when an agency finding
cannot be sustained on the record made in agency proceedings.' 3 2 It is
suggested that the "specific findings" requirement of Armcor 1 133 is more
akin to requiring an adequate record than to imposing additional, unwanted
procedures upon the Board.
A second criticism of the Armcor I rule might be that requiring
"specific findings" and a "reasoned analysis" usurps the Board's function in
derogation of the Gissel Court's clear admonition that deference and respect
be accorded the Board's choice of remedy.' 3 4 Arguably, so long as the
Board appears to have acted reasonably, a reviewing court should defer to
the Board's expertise in determining whether a bargaining order is warranted. However, as one commentator has stated: "This type of respect
should not be interpreted as evidence of an intent to give the NLRB carte
blanche authority to substitute presumptuous inferences in place of cogent
and objective analysis under the guise of 'expertise.' "13.
Similarly, the
Armcor I court pointed out that the courts are charged with a reviewing
function, and deference to the Board does not mandate "abdication of that
function." 136 It is submitted that requiring a reasoned analysis so that the
courts can undertake informed judicial review in no way usurps the Board's
authority or intimates that its choice of remedy is not respected.

129. Note that Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. dealt with the relationship between administrative agencies and courts in general, and was
not a labor-related case involving the Board. See 435 U.S. 519, 538-58 (1978); note 94 supra.
130. The court did not suggest or impose procedures by which the Board was to make its
determinations, but simply required the Board to document the process which it used. 535
F.2d at 245.
131. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra. In remanding to the Board, the Armcor I
court manifested its view that certain minimum findings must be made by the Board in order
for the court to be able to accurately determine whether the Board acted correctly in deciding
to issue a bargaining order under Gissel. 535 F.2d at 245.
132. 435 U.S. at 549, quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973). The Court stated: "If
that [agency] finding is not sustainable on the administrative record made, then the [agency's]
decision must be vacated and the matter remanded to [it] for further consideration." 435 U.S. at
549, quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973).
133. See note 131 supra.
134. See notes 24-27 & 36 and accompanying text supra.
135. Perl, The NLRB and Bargaining Orders: Does a New Era Begin with Gissel?, 15 VILL.
L. REv. 106, 117 (1969).
136. 535 F.2d at 245, citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951). See
also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
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It is further contended that the failure of the Board to make "specific
findings" and to undertake "a detailed analysis," together with the failure of
courts to impose such requirements on the Board, undermine the twin goals
of Gissel-i.e., deterrence of employer misconduct and effectuation of
employee free choice. 137 Free choice, the paramount principle of our national labor policy, 138 is advanced by thorough and complete evaluation of
the impact of the employer's unlawful conduct on the employees. Imposition
of a bargaining order without considering whether the employees would be
able to express their free choice despite the employer's unfair labor practices
renders the bargaining order punitive rather than remedial. 1 39 In order to
avoid denying employees the freedom to choose their bargaining representative, if any, it is essential that the Board consider the effectiveness of
traditional remedies. 140 Since election is the preferred method for ascertaining whether a union has attained majority status, 141 a Gissel bargaining order ought not to issue until the Board has considered, and found impossible, the holding of a fair election. It is suggested that the court in
Armcor I did no more than require the Board to fulfull its functions as de1 42
lineated by the Supreme Court in Gissel.

137. See 395 U.S. at 614.
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 which states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a)(3).
Id (emphasis added).
139. See NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc. (American Cable II), 427 F.2d 446, 448 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). The Amnerican Cable II court stated: "The [bargaining]
order is not a traditional punitive remedy, but is a therapeutic one. It is not, therefore, the type
of remedy which is automatically entitled to enforcement at any time after the occurrence of the
unfair labor practice." Id.
140. For a discussion of the traditional remedies, see notes 19-20 & 39 and accompanying text
supra.
141. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
142. Compare NLRB v. Cissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 614-15 with NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d at 244-45. In Gissel, the Supreme Court expected "specific findings" from
the Board, anticipating an analysis, for example, of "the extensiveness of the employer's unfair
labor practices in terms of their past effect on election conditions and the likelihood of their
recurrence in the future." 395 U.S. at 614. Further, the Court required the Board to consider
"the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair
rerun) by the use of traditional remedies" before it issues a bargaining order. Id. at 614-15.
As read and applied by the Third Circuit in Arncor I,
Gissel itself contemplates that the Board "must make 'specific findings' as to the immediate and residual impact of the unfair labor practices on the election process and that
the Board must make a 'detailed analysis' assessing the possibility of holding a fair election
in terms of any continuing effect of misconduct, the likelihood of recurring misconduct,
and the potential effectiveness of ordinary remedies.
535 F.2d at 244, quoting Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118 (7th Cir.
1973).
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B. The Board, on Remand, Should Consider Changed
Circumstances Existing at the Time of the Remand
In Armcor I, the Third Circuit asked the Board to consider the changed
circumstances existing at the plant at the time of the remand, requiring the
Board to evaluate whether the disruptive effect of the employer's unfair
labor practices persisted to such a degree that a fair election was still impossible. 1 43 It is suggested that, because this was precisely the issue upon
which the outcome of Armcor II turned, the Armcor III court must have
have been divided over, this same question in its reconsidered, and may
14 4
hearing en banc.
An evaluation of the treatment to be accorded changed circumstances
on remand must take into account the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. L.B. Foster.1 45 In this case, the
employer argued that circumstances had drastically changed between the
time the Board had issued its order to bargain and the time the court considered the Board's petition to enforce. 146 The Ninth Circuit's position,
which the Board subsequently adopted, 1 47 was that consideration of present
conditions would prolong final disposition of a case by providing an incentive
for employers to continue litigation for as long as possible. 148 Therefore,
the court concluded that changed conditions should not be considered in
49
such a situation.'
Admittedly, circumstances continually change, and if these changes
were to be considered in every enforcement decision, Board bargaining orders would be difficult to enforce. Significantly, however, the position of the
Ninth Circuit and the Board is distinguishable from that of the Third Circuit, since the Armcor litigation involved a remand for additional findings,
while the Ninth Circuit case merely involved a delayed petition for enforcement.' 50 The importance of this distinction will be made apparent by considering a Fifth Circuit case which was similar to the Armcor situation.

143. See 535 F.2d at 246. See also note 74 and accompanying text supra.
144. See 98 L.R.R.M. at 2442. See also note 112 and accompanying text supra.
145. 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
146. 418 F.2d at 4. The Ninth Circuit enforced the bargaining order because it did not wish
to encourage employers to prolong litigation by refusing to abide by Board orders and then
asserting that circumstances had changed at the time the case reached the appellate court for
enforcement. Id.
147. See Armcor Indus., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1545.
148. 418 F.2d at 4. See note 146 supra.
149. 418 F.2d at 4.
150. Compare NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 98 L.R.R.M. at 2442 with NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d at 4. The Armcor 11 court stated:
We do not hold that the Board must always consider present conditions at the plant
of every labor law infractor ordered to bargain by the Board. We only hold that present
conditions become relevant after a remand caused by inadequate justification by the
After a remand . . . the parameters have changed. The
Board for its initial order ....
critical question becomes whether the employees at the plant at the time of the remand
would still be unable to participate in a fair election.
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Like the Armcor cases, NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc. (American Cable II),lM involved a remand to the Board for additional findings in
light of Gissel. 152 It is submitted that the approach of the Fifth Circuit,
echoed by the Third Circuit in Armcor I, provides the proper procedure
under the Supreme Court's opinion in Gissel. Since the delay in final
disposition of the case results from the Board's failure to make the specific
findings which the court requires, it is reasonable to order the Board to
evaluate the changed circumstances at the time of the remand. Consideration of the subsequent circumstances will not encourage abuse by the
employer in the litigation process since the employer cannot precipitate a
remand by failing to adhere to a bargaining order. 153 It is suggested that
failure to determine the likelihood of a fair election on remand is to ignore
what ought to be one of a Gissel bargaining order's most significant goals154
the effectuation of employee free choice.
C. Rather Than Engaging in an Independent Analysis, It Is
Sufficient for the Board to Adopt the Findings and Conclusions of the ALJ
The rule adopted by the Third Circuit in Armcor I required the Board
to justify the issuance of a bargaining order by specifically indicating the
impact of the employer's unfair labor practices on the election process, and
155
providing a detailed analysis of the possibility of holding a fair election.
In Craw, the court held the Board itself responsible for finding the specific
facts, and asserted that this duty could not be discharged, in compliance
with Armcor I, through a perfunctory adoption of the ALJ's findings. 156
This principle was abandoned upon rehearing in Kenworth M in which the
panel ruled that if the ALJ had satisfied the Armcor I requirements of a

Id. (emphasis in original). See also NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 427 F.2d 446, 448
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). In distinguishing L.B. Foster, the American Cable
II court stated:
The Foster case is distinguishable because although it was decided after Gissel it did
not involve a remand in light of that case to the Board for additional findings. In the
instant case, . . . [t]he Board's original findings were inadequate under the teachings of
Gissel and the case had to be remanded to the Board for further findings.
427 F.2d at 448.
151. 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). For a discussion of the
American Cable cases, see notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
152. Compare NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 98 L.R.R.M. at 2442 n.1 with NLRB v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 427 F.2d at 448. For the Armeor and American Cable courts' consideration of the fact that the bargaining orders had been remanded, see note 150 supra.
153. See Note, "After All, Tomorrow Is Another Day": Should Subsequent Events Affect the
Validity of Bargaining Orders?, 31 STAN. L. REv. 505, 524-25 (1979).
154. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. Gissel was clear in indicating that the goal of
effectuating employee free choice was as important as deterring employer misconduct. Id. The
failure to consider changed circumstances on remand may effectively punish the employer by
reaffirming the bargaining order, but this may occur at the expense of employee free choice
which may better be served by an election.
155. 535 F.2d at 245-46. See notes 65-74 and accompanying text supra.
156. 565 F.2d at 1270. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
157. 580 F.2d at 61. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
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"detailed analysis," and the Board had specifically adopted the ALJ's findings
and conclusions, it would be unnecessary for the Board to make specific
15
findings of its own.'
It is suggested, that this issue most likely did not divide the Third Circuit in its rehearing of Armcor en banc, since by that time the Armcor I
requirement of independent Board findings had been modified and already
applied as modified.' 5 9 Furthermore, this issue was not directly before the
court; in its consideration of the case on remand, the Board had itself engaged in discussion of the case without reliance on the opinion of the
ALJ. 16 0 In light of the Armcor III court's failure to explicitly approve or
disapprove the Armcor I requirement of an independent analysis by the
Board, however, discussion of the competing policy considerations may be
useful for future allocation of the responsibility should the Third Circuit
readopt that requirement.
Arguably, since it is the Board which is considered to have expertise in
matters of labor law and which is, therefore, invested with the authority to
make policy decisions, 161 the Board itself ought to undertake the required
1 62
analysis. Further, because bargaining orders are extraordinary remedies,
it would seem reasonable to require the Board itself to determine whether
such a remedy is appropriate.
Conversely, since the Board is faced with a very large volume of cases,
it is customary and reasonable for the Board, rather than engaging in an
independent analysis, to simply adopt those findings and conclusions of the
ALJ which it finds acceptable.' 63 It is submitted that this practice is satisfactory because the Board itself retains ultimate authority in that it must
either specifically adopt the findings and conclusions of the ALJ, or engage
in its own analysis.' 4 In addition, the ALJ is in a better position than the
Board to determine whether a bargaining order should issue because he has
heard the witnesses and can render a decision based on live testimony rather
65
than on a bare record.'
It is suggested that to require the Board to engage in independent
analysis in all of the cases would constitute nothing less than mandating that
the Board discard its adopted practice and procedure, contrary to the Supreme Court's express directive that reviewing courts should not impose
their conceptions of proper procedures for decisionmaking with respect to

158. 580 F.2d at 62-63. The principle adopted by the panel upon rehearing in Kenworth was
clearly adhered to by the court in Daybreak Lodge. See 585 F.2d at 79; notes 103-06 and
accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 157-58 and accompanying text supra.
160. See 227 N.L.R.B. 1543, 1543-45 (1977).
161. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
162. See 395 U.S. at 614. Bargaining orders are not to be issued unless traditional conventional remedies have been determined to be inadequate. Id. See notes 19-20, 26 & 39 and
accompanying text supra.
163. See R. GoamAN, supra note 1, at 8-9.
164. See id.
165. Id.
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subjects within the scope of agency expertise. 166 Furthermore, imposition
of such a burden on the Board could foreseeably reduce its productivity,
since an in-depth analysis and specific findings would be required in every
case concerning the propriety of a bargaining order. It is submitted that the
Supreme Court's recently expressed philosophy has so tipped the balance in
favor of the government interest in having agencies "free to establish their
own procedures," 167 that if the "detailed analysis" requirement has survived
the rehearing of Armcor en banc, or alternatively, if it is revived, the
Board's adoption of ALJ findings and conclusions should be considered sufficient.
V. CONCLUSION

Upon reconsideration of the issues presented by a petition for enforcement of a Gissel bargaining order, the Third Circuit should reinstitute the
Armcor I requirements of "specific findings" and a "detailed analysis" as to
the necessity for the issuance of the order.' 6
Protection of employee free
choice mandates at a minimum that the Board consider the effect of
traditional remedies and articulate the reasons supporting its conclusions.
Furthermore, a detailed analysis was required by the Gissel Court 169 and
would appear to be mandatory if a reviewing court is to perform its function
adequately.
It has been suggested that in its rehearing of Armcor en banc, the Third
Circuit may have split over two issues peripheral to the "specific findings"
rule developed in Armcor J.170 With respect to the first issue, the sugges166. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
167. Kenworth Trucks of Phila., Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d at 62.
168. The post-Armcor III, Gissel bargaining order cases illustrate that the state of the law on
this issue in the Third Circuit remains confused. Compare Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 103
L.R.R.M. 2908 (3d Cir. 1980) with Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 103 L.R.R.M. 2162 (3d Cir.
1979).
In Rapid Manufacturing, the court refused to enforce a bargaining order because the record lacked "substantial evidence that the unfair labor practices in this case were serious enough,
or pervasive enough" to dissipate the union's majority and preclude the holding of a fair election. 103 L.R.R.M. at 2166. In essence, although the court did not mention the Armcor I
requirements, it refused enforcement of the order on the very similar ground of failure by the
Board to comply with Gissel. Id. at 2167. The court stated: "We would be remiss in our judicial
functions if, on a record as sparse as this one, we were to enforce a bargaining order which, on
every count, cannot even be regarded as colorably in compliance with Gissel." Id.
Conversely, in Midland-Ross, a 2-1 majority of the court enforced a bargaining order, finding that the reasoning of the Board was supported by substantial evidence without mention of
the Armcor 1 requirements. 103 L.R.R.M. at 2915. Judge Weis, however, made reference to
the Armcor 1 requirements in his dissent, stating that "acceptance of Board 'expertise' to support
conclusory 'boilerplate', without a reasoned analysis does not comport with proper judicial review." Id. at 2918 (Weis, J., dissenting), citing NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239 (3d
Cir. 1976). Moreover, Judge Weis noted that the "[r]outine issuance of bargaining orders after a
review of the facts and a conclusory finding that the unfair labor practices were 'egregious',
'pervasive' or 'chilling' is simply unacceptable." Id. Judge Weis also noted that the Board failed
to assess the efficacy of traditional remedies in ensuring a fair rerun election. Id. at 2919 (Weis,
J., dissenting).
169. 395 U.S. at 614.
170. See notes 143-67 and accompanying text supra.
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tion has been made that, in light of recent Supreme Court pronouncements,
it would be sufficient for the Board to adopt the findings and conclusions of
an ALJ whose opinion is sufficiently detailed to satisfy Armcor I, without
requiring independent analysis by the Board itself. 171 Concerning the second issue in dispute, this comment has suggested that should a court find it
necessary to remand to the Board for additional findings, it would be appropriate to require an analysis of the conditions presently existing at the
plant-taking into account changed circumstances-in determining whether
1 72
a bargaining order should issue.
Upon reconsideration of these issues, it is submitted that the failure of
the Third Circuit to return to an Armcor I requirement of "specific findings"
could only be viewed as an abrogation of the court's reviewing function. 173
If the court is not provided with specific findings and a detailed analysis of
the necessity for the utilization of the extraordinary remedy of a bargaining
order, it will be forced to base its review on the Board's conclusions, support
for which is not presented in the record. Board bargaining orders will inevitably be enforced, and the court will function merely as a rubber stamp.
Liberal or routine enforcement of Board bargaining orders would counter
the crucial teaching of Gissel that elections are preferred in order to best
effectuate the goal of employee free choice.*
Louis A. Minella.
171. See notes 155-67 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 143-53 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 132 & 136 and accompanying text supra.
* Editor's Note: As this Comment went to print, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, decided Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB (Hedstrom II), Nos. 78-1800-01 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 1980), which
resolved the split in the court evidenced in Aryncor III and settled the issue of the analysis to
be required of the Board in issuing a bargaining order in the Third Circuit. For a discussion of
the original panel decision in Hedstrom (Hedstron I), see notes 82-84 and accompanying text
supra. In a further retreat from the Armcor I doctrine, the Hedstrom II court exhibited an
extremely deferential approach to the Board's determination that a bargaining order was appropriate and refused to consider the issue of whether changed circumstances should have affected the Board's decision. See Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, Nos. 78-1800-01, slip op. at 16 (3d
Cir. Aug. 6, 1980). Judge Rosenn-the author of the court's opinions in Armcor I & 11-joined
by Judges Weis and Garth, dissented, concluding that the majority had improperly deferred to
the Board which had not provided any evidence demonstrating that a fair rerun election would
be impossible and whose presumed expertise is actually "more imagined than real." Id. slip op.
at 38-39 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Arsncor line of cases, see notes 65-84 &
107-18 and accompanying text supra.
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